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INTRODUCTION

The South Texas Law Review on Ethical Obligations and Liabilities Arising from Lawyers' Professional Associations presented an important opportunity to consider how law is practiced at a time of
exciting economic, political, and social change. Small wonder that the
computerization of the workplace, the innovations in information
technology, the globalization of commerce, and the radical changes in
the law of business enterprises are major factors moving law practice
into the current age of entrepreneurship. 1 To be sure, entrepreneurial
activity has occurred in the past and marks humankind's evolution
from cave-dwelling hunter-gatherers, to the industrial revolution, to a
post-modem society where boundaries for business and social intercourse have disappeared.2 Similarly, the boundaries for how and
* Tom Bevill Chairholder of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. The
author expresses gratitude and appreciation to Professor Teresa Stanton Collett for hosting
this Symposium and for inspiring my reflection. I am also grateful for the insights of my
colleague, Bill Brewbaker, and the research assistance of Stephanie Larkins.
1. For over thirteen years I have taught a Small Business Theory Seminar which
studies entrepreneurship, small businesses, economic development, and attendant legal
and policy issues informing legal practitioners who assist entrepreneurial business enterprises. Much of the material on entrepreneurship is drawn from my article, Steven H.
Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship,26 CAP. U. L. REV. 227,241 (1997).
2. For a unique perspective on the changes in the world spurred by the age of information, see PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW REALITIES: IN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, IN
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS, IN SOCIETY AND WORLD VIEw 257-58 (1989). Drucker, in
summarizing his work and reviewing the changes from agrarian society to post-industrial
society, notes:
A great deal these days (almost too much) is being said and written about the
impact of the information technologies on the material civilization, on goods,
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where lawyers practice have disappeared, offering fascinating ethical
challenges. 3

To fully appreciate the impact change has had on our current professional climate, we should first consider some of the salient features
of the entrepreneurial era. Entrepreneurship is fundamentally about

the identification of POSSIBILITIES! How can one deliver a service
or provide a product which will reap financial, social, and psychological rewards? A concise statement of this phenomenon is: "Entrepreneurship is the process of creating value by pulling together a unique
package of resources to exploit an opportunity." 4 The entrepreneur
sees-the world from a unique perspective and visualizes the possible

when no one else can. First, note that entrepreneurship is an analytical process which requires scanning the legal, social, and economic en-

vironment for opportunities to provide the service.' Second, these
opportunities usually are marked by recognizing changes in the business or legal environment.6 Third, the changes themselves are often
services, and businesses. The social impacts are, however, as important; indeed,
they may be more important. One of the impacts is widely noticed: any such
change triggers an explosion of entrepreneurship. In fact the entrepreneurial
surge which began in the United States in the late 1970s, and which within ten
years had spread to all non-Communist developed countries, is the fourth such
surge since Denis Papin's [original designer of the steam engine] time three hundred years ago.
Id. at 256.
3. We now have multi-jurisdictional law practices which required an addition to our
rules of ethics. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5 (1997) (explaining guidelines used to choose law and disciplinary authority when more than one jurisdiction's rules may potentially apply). For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see the
1995 Symposium, Ethics and the MultijurisdictionalPracticeof Law, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 657
(1995). Ethical challenges also face those who practice in the international arena. See
generally STEIN INSTITUTE OF LAW & ETHics, RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHics IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE (Mary C. Daly & Roger J. Goebel eds., 1994).
4.

HOWARD H.

STEVENSON ET AL., NEW BUSINESS VENTURES AND THE ENTREPRE-

16 (2d ed. 1985).
5. See generally Larry R. Smeltzer et al., Environmental Scanning Practicesin Small
Business, J. SMALL Bus. MGMT., July 1988, at 55 (providing a detailed discussion of information gathering and strategic planning for small business).
6. For a provocative critique of our current legal system, see generally Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-Modern, Multi-Cultural
World, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 49 (1996). Professor Menkel-Meadow urges
us to rethink how we resolve problems in contemporary society. See id. at 49-50. She
observes:
Modern life presents us with complex problems which often require complex
and multi-faceted solutions. Courts, with what I have called their "limited remedial imaginations" (limited by statute and common law to the powers of granting
monetary damages or injunctions) may not be the best institutional settings for
resolving some of the disputes we continue to put before them.
Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
NEUR
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produced by technical or theoretical innovations introduced into the
marketplace. 7 This could include new regulatory schemes,' legal principles,9 or evolving needs of potential clients. 10 As suggested above,
computer technologies have created new and faster methods of pro-

viding services.11
This statement about entrepreneurship entails the source of two
ethical challenges for lawyers. The first is that clients, who are also
impacted by the entrepreneurial age, now demand that lawyers deliver services which add value to their endeavors. Clients are faced
with the same legal, social, and economic forces and must conduct

their increasingly complex affairs in an efficient and effective fashion. 2 Legal professional services must add value and enhance the en7. "Innovation is the specific instrument of entrepreneurship. It is the act that endows resources with a new capacity to create wealth ....
There is no such thing as a 'resource' until man finds a use for something in nature and thus endows it with economic
value." PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 30 (1985).
8. For a discussion of new tax incentives designed to promote investment in small
businesses, see generally Marc D. Teitelbaum, The New Tax Benefit Entities: Qualified
Small Business Corporationsand Specialized Small Business Investment Companies, 21 J.
CORP. TAX'N 220 (1994).
9. This symposium focuses on the law of limited liability companies, which is an example of radical change in the legal environment.
10. A new area of practice has emerged to meet the special needs of elderly clients.
See generally Special Issue, Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 961 (1994).
11. Electronic technologies, such as e-mail and facsimile transmissions, present new
concerns for legal ethics. Some states are addressing the issue of Internet technologies and
have issued ethics opinions giving guidance on proper use. See Arizona State Bar Comm.
on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 97-04, reprintedin 13 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 125 (May 14, 1997); North Carolina State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 239,
reprintedin 13 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 42 (Mar. 5, 1997); Vermont Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 97-5, reprintedin 13 Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 210 (July 23, 1997).
12. Lawyers are not, and never have been, luxuries. The pressure not to waste valuable time and resources is behind the promise of alternative dispute resolution techniques.
See Kelly P. Corr & David R. Goodnight, Making ADR Cost Effective: Simple Tips to
Make ADR Work for You 1993, at 517 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 481, 1993). Additionally, clients are concerned about the high fees associated
with legal services. Some have advocated a system of value billing as articulated by one
author:
The concept of value billing is based on two principles. The first is that the
value of legal services is, in large part, determined by the client rather than the
lawyer, after the client is placed in a position to make informed decisions concerning the type and scope of legal services to be rendered. The other principle is
that the attorney shares with the client the economic risk of bearing the expense
of the legal services being rendered.
Demetrios Dimitriou, The Individual Practitionerand Commercialism in the Profession:
How Can the Individual Survive?, 45 S.C. L. REV. 965, 972-73 (1994). But see generally
Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Is Value Billing the Answer?: A Response to The Individual Practi-
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deavors of clients. 13 Second, to succeed in a profession which is
increasingly competitive, a lawyer must be creative and innovative in
delivering and marketing his or her professional services. To stand
out from the crowd, the lawyer must "pull together a unique package
of resources" to competently and efficiently service a client. Here, the
entrepreneurial process calls for the lawyer to ask five questions about
the practice: "Where is the opportunity? How do I capitalize on it?
What resources do I need? How do I gain control over them? What
structure is best?" 14 The entrepreneurial lawyer looks out into the
world to see where there are growing areas of legal services. 5 The
lawyer must consider the number of associations or affiliations that
would produce the desired results.1 6 Additionally, electronic innovations in legal research and service provision must be considered. 7 Finally, thought must be given to how these services are delivered given
the context of legal, social, and economic forces. The myriad of forms
of lawyers' professional associations offer new possibilities for structuring a legal practice.
Faced with an entrepreneurial reality, I find Professor Thomas
Morgan's comments examining present day practice complexities telling in an obvious manner: "It was a simpler world .... But those days
are probably gone forever."' 8 This reflection explores how ethical
tensions are produced when lawyers choose innovative and creative
professional associations designed to meet present entrepreneurial realities. It begins with a re-examination of the old debate on whether
lawyers are in a profession or a business. The next section identifies
ethical tensions springing from changes in the way lawyers practice.
These tensions are recognized in United States Supreme Court decisions issued over the past twenty years. The cases considered by the
tioner and Commercialism in the Profession, 45 S.C. L. REV. 991 (1994) (responding to
Demetrios Dimitriou and exploring why attorneys "must pay attention to the bottom line
in order to service their clients.").
13. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239, 241-43 (1984); see also generally Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1
(1995) (discussing the notion that lawyers can create value).
14. Howard H. Stevenson & David E. Gumpert, The Heart of Entrepreneurship,
HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 85, 87.
15. Consider for a moment the changes in tort reform and limitations on damage
awards. Are there still enough economic incentives to enter the field of personal injury?
16. See Gary S. Rosin, The Hard Heart of the Enterprise:Goodwill and the Role of the
Law Firm, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 315, 323-31 (1998).
17. Many states have laws and legal forms on CD-ROM format. Westlaw and Lexis
construct research engines to search increasingly diverse and voluminous databases.
18. Thomas D. Morgan, Conflicts of Interest and the New Forms of ProfessionalAssociations, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 243 (1998).
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Court during this entrepreneurial era examine new methods of marketing and delivering professional services, including lawyer advertising, solicitation, and trial publicity. The third section focuses on
economic pressures which drive traditional professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, to deliver their services in new and more complex
modalities. Finally, the reflection concludes that while we are practicing law in a whole new world, the traditional values of the profession
must still inform ethical lawyers who seek to deliver services efficiently and effectively.

II.

REVIVAL OF AN OLD DEBATE

The current age of entrepreneurial activity dictates looking anew
at how we practice law. Professor Allan Vestal suggests in his work
that we have entered "new regimes" where increasingly different ways
of organizing a law firm abound.' 9 Professor Vestal argues that the
model of practice has changed from a professional to a mercantilist
model.2" I take him to mean that the practice of law is increasingly
driven by business considerations and protecting the financial bottomline of law practice. Of primary concern is limiting the impact of legal
malpractice judgments on law firm participants by introducing business entities which limit liabilities.2 '
This certainly is not a new debate. In 1916, Julius Henry Cohen
published his book entitled The Law: Business or Profession?, in
which issues such as commercial advertising, solicitation, and lawyers
managing debt collection agencies (an early version of ancillary business) are considered. 22 Then, as now, the concern was for the commercialization of law practice.23 Professor Vestal expertly summarizes
the literature outlining the parameters of the debate. 24 More impor-

19. See Allan W. Vestal, Special Ethical and Fiduciary Challenges for Law Firms
Under the New and Revised Unincorporated Business Forms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 445,
447-50 (1998).
20. See id. at 457-60.
21. See Susan Saab Fortney, ProfessionalResponsibility and Liability Issues Related to
Limited Liability Law Partnerships,39 S. TEX. L. REV. 399, 400-01 (1998).
22. See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 173-200,
299-301 (1916).
23. See generally Symposium, Conference on the Commercializationof the Legal Profession, 45 S.C. L. REV. 875 (1994) (discussing the commercializing trend in the legal
profession).
24. See Vestal, supra note 19, at 446 n.2.
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tantly, he correctly puts forward the Howard v. Babcock25 case for the
proposition that:
One could argue that these economic changes have transformed
the practice, resulting in a mercantilist model for the practice of
corporate and commercial law. This new model rivals and may
have eclipsed, but not yet completely displaced, the traditional
professional model of corporate and commercial law practice.
The core of the mercantilist model is the conceptualization of
law as a commodity to be sold in a competitive market. The
attitudinal change associated with the commodification of the
law is the compromise or abandonment of the practitioner's
identity as a professional.26

The commodification of the practice of law partly views clients as
means to the greater financial ends of lawyers. Professor Gary
Rosin's article on the mobility of lawyers furthers this inquiry. 27 He
studies the economic forces propelling lawyers to move from one firm
to another, taking clients and dollars with them. 28 Again, the emphasis is on how the practice of law has become grounded in the active
management of a business enterprise. The commercial nature of law

practice is guiding the legal structures and the relationships lawyers
create for engaging in this enterprise.

Professor Vestal, in another work, has argued that in the new regime of unincorporated and limited liability business entities, we have

made a mess of partnerships and partnership law.29 The key concern
25. 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993), rev'd upon appeal from remand, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Ct.
App. 1995), and review denied and opinion orderednot officially published, Cal. Minutes, at
24 (Feb. 15, 1996).
26. Vestal, supra note 19, at 459-60. I would expand his analysis to include other
forms of practice, including family law. The traditional model of practicing family law has
changed as lawyers are called upon to assist with the intergenerational needs of a family.
See Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs, The Ethical Management of Assets for Elder
Clients: A Context, Role, and Law Approach, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1411, 1424 (1994).
27. See generally Rosin, supra note 16.
28. See generally id.
29. See generally Allan W. Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat.
: The Mess We
Have Made of PartnershipLaw, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (1997) (discussing the legal
profession's collective failure in the area of partnership law). Professor Vestal analyzes the
recent changes in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) against the backdrop of
Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, a case which holds a law firm liable for breach
of fiduciary duty in the ouster of a firm partner. See id. at 489-94 (discussing Beasley v.
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ", 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July
23, 1996)). He posits:
Behind advocates' arguments over the application of the existing or emerging
law, and behind disputes over new forms and uniformity within forms, we have
abandoned the historical 'consensus on the theory of partnership law without having any consensus with which to replace it. We have discarded historical assumptions about the nature of partnership law, the importance of personal
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is that now the fundamental value of fiduciary duty has been constricted, and in a way which leaves it unclear as to the ethical obligations of lawyers to each other in a firm and to their clients.3 ° I suggest
that this debate can be placed in the larger context of fundamental
changes in our society, in our economy, and in our legal, economic,
and social relationships.3 ' Moreover, the context must consider the
issue of how professional services are delivered to clients in an age of
fast-moving, entrepreneurial activity. In the next section, I argue that
we are witnessing a major paradigm shift in the presentation and performance of professional services.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT TO ENTREPRENEURIAL
PRACTICE

The practice of law has always been in a state of flux, but the way
we practice changed irrevocably when the United States Supreme
Court decided Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.32 By permitting legal
advertising,3 3 the Court allowed the profession to fully enter the en-

trepreneurial age. When lawyers can market their services and distinguish themselves from an ever-growing field, the seeds of creativity
and innovation germinate. 34 Lawyers now aggressively go after busiresponsibility as reflected in the liability of general partners, and the desirability
of uniform laws. And that abandonment of shared assumptions is the root cause
of our failure and the resulting mess we have made of the law of the unincorporated firm.
Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
30. See id. at 487-88.
31. For a perceptive discussion considering the contextual nature of practice, see generally David B. Wilkins, Afterword: How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?-Managing Conflict and Context in ProfessionalRegulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
465 (1996). Wilkins describes the contextual situation of the lawyer thusly:
As a descriptive matter, the universal claims of the traditional model are belied
by two features of contemporary law practice. First, the increasing specialization
and diversification among lawyers and clients renders any single image of the
lawyer/client relationship, e.g., the traditional model's implicit image of a solo
practitioner representing an individual client, inaccurate and misleading. At the
same time, the proliferation of formal and informal regulatory mechanisms directed either expressly or as a practical matter at particular subgroups within the
profession belies any suggestion that these diverse lawyers and clients are subject
to a unitary set of normative rules and enforcement practices.
Id. at 482-83 (citation omitted). See also Hobbs & Hobbs, supra note 26, at 1412 (discussing practicing in the context of elder clients).
32. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
33. See id. at 383.
34. The organized bar was concerned about the impact of legal advertising. The ABA
Commission on Advertising conducted a survey to determine what, if anything, lawyers
and clients thought of legal advertising. See Jerome E. Bogutz & William E. Hornsby, Jr.,

606
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ness in unprecedented fashions. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court,35 a lawyer used a newspaper advertisement to let the public know of his availability to bring action against
the manufacturer of a defective intrauterine device. 36 The advertisement contained illustrations and a short description of the possible
harm caused by the defective intrauterine device.3 7 While stating that
false and misleading advertising can be regulated,3 8 the Court concluded that such advertisements inform the public of legal issues and
offer opportunities to protect one's rights.3 9 Such class action cases
can now be packaged by lawyers trolling for dollars in the world of
product failures and consumer fraud.4"
Dignity in Lawyer Advertising: What the Survey Says, B. LEADER, July-Aug. 1990, at 15.
One review of the survey found that, for those lawyers who desire to advertise:
[T]he study suggests that you exercise good judgment in the quality and content
of your advertising. To compromise your profession for short-term gains is short
sighted. If you believe clients want competent representation from professionals
they can respect and trust, then we believe ... that such good judgment will not
only improve respect for you and your profession but, in the long term, should
prove positive to your bottom line.
Id. at 35.
35. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
36. See id. at 630. The attorney also placed an advertisement advising of his availability to defend drunk driving cases. See id. at 629-30.
37. See id. at 631. While there were no allegations that the ads were "false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive," Id. at 634, the attorney was charged with violating several
provisions of the Ohio Code of ProfessionalResponsibility:
With respect to the Dalkon Shield advertisement, the complaint [as subsequently
amended], alleged that in running the ad and accepting employment by women
responding to it, appellant had violated the following Disciplinary Rules: DR 2101(B), which prohibits the use of illustrations in advertisements run by attorneys, requires that ads by attorneys be "dignified," and limits the information that
may be included in such ads to a list of 20 items; DR 2-103(A), which prohibits an
attorney from "recommend[ing] employment, as a private practitioner, of himself,
his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding
employment of a lawyer;" and DR 2-104(A), which provides (with certain exceptions not applicable here) that "[a] lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a
layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice."
Id. at 631-33 (alterations in original).
38. See id. at 638. For a discussion of developing law which regulates and establishes
guidelines on false and fraudulent advertising, see Jeffrey S. Edelstein, Advertising Law in
the New Media Age 1997, at 9 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
1010, 1997).
39. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 640.
40. See PATRICK M. GARRY, A NATION OF ADVERSARIES: How THE LITIGATION ExPLOSION Is RESHAPING AMERICA 179-82 (1997). But see generally Russell F. Moran, System Self-Corrects Tort "Flaws," N.J. LAW., Mar. 13, 1995, at 6 ("A GAO study that

questioned the existence of a 'litigation explosion' noted that only 10 percent of the 7
million cases filed in state courts across the country are tort cases of any kind.").
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Other cases extended the profession's journey into commercialism. After Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,4 ' lawyers were allowed to
reach out and touch potential clients with direct mail and phone solicitation.4 2 The ability to directly target potential clients with identifiable legal issues was a major leap for lawyers.43 Consequently,
lawyers now utilize the Internet for general and targeted solicitation. 4
They create web pages for placing ads and link their sites with those of
satisfied clients. 45 Client getting, or what was historically called rainmaking, has entered the entrepreneurial age.
The spirit of entrepreneurship has fostered the development of
niche markets for lawyers. Joel Hyatt created franchised, walk-in
legal clinics to provide legal services to the average citizen who may
not know how to find a lawyer or how to pay for one.46 Legal service
plans, funded like medical insurance, emerged to meet legal needs in
an economical manner. 47 Creative lawyers sought to separate themselves from the crowded field of practitioners by boldly identifying
their unique specialties. The Supreme Court upheld a lawyer's right
to so identify him or herself as a specialist as long as it was not misleading.48 Even within special areas of practice, such as family law,
lawyers created subspecialities and methods for identifying extraordinary practitioners. Now the elite lawyer who meets stringent qualifications may be invited to join the chosen few in the American

41.
42.
43.

486 U.S. 466 (1988).
See id. at 479.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1997) (governing direct

in-person and live telephone contact of prospective clients). The rule was modified in 1989
to reflect the holding in Shapero. See id. It is, however, limited to direct mail and autodialed phone calls as the comments reflect:
This potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person or live telephone solicitation of prospective clients justifies its prohibition, particularly since lawyer ad-

vertising and written and recorded communication permitted under Rule 7.2 offer
alternative means of conveying necessary information to those who may be in
need of legal services.

Id. cmt.
44. See Ethics Opinions, supra note 11.
45. See Cincinnati Bar Ass'n Ethics and Professional Responsibility Comm., Op. 9697-01, reprinted in 13 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 235 (Aug. 6, 1997) (per-

mitting such practice).
46. See generally Gay Jervey, Joel Hyatt, AM. LAW., Mar. 1989, at 88.
47. A friend of mine markets legal service plans to truckers. These plans provide
legal assistance and bail bond service while a trucker is on the road away from home.
48. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 207 (1982); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990).
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Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.4 9 This group of distinguished lawyers has even promulgated their own standards of ethical conduct.5 °
Attorneys must be creative and innovative in providing services

to clients, in part because their needs and expectations have changed.
The work goes beyond the boundaries of the law office and the court-

room. A lawyer may be called upon to be aggressively entrepreneurial in the marketplace of public opinion and to serve in a
public relations capacity. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,51 Domi-

nick Gentile was sanctioned by the Nevada Bar for violating the trial
publicity provisions of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, which is almost identical to Model Rule 3.6.52 The Supreme Court considered
the extent to which a lawyer could communicate with the press without violating the ethical rule constraining trial publicity.53 The Court

essentially considered this case as one involving the free speech rights
of the lawyer acting on behalf of a client balanced against the state's
interest in preserving the integrity and fairness of the trial process.5 4

The Court overturned the sanction in part because the rule was ambiguous and in part because the Court recognized that often a zealous,
49. Founded in 1962, the Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' main objective is "[t]o
encourage the study, improve the practice, elevate the standards and advance the cause of
matrimonial law, to the end that the welfare of the family and society be preserved." Edward Schaefer, Message from the President,1 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. vii (1985).

50.

See Robert H. Aronson, Introduction: The Bounds of Advocacy, 9 J. AM. ACAD.

MATRIMONIAL LAW. 41, 41 (1992); Martin Guggenheim, The Making of Standardsfor Rep-

resenting Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings:The Reporter's Perspective, 13 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 35, 55 (1995).

51. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
52. See id. at 1033. Gentile was concerned that certain pretrial publicity would hurt
his client's chances of obtaining a fair trial. See id. at 1042. In fact, the client was being
railroaded by corrupt law enforcement agents and the First Amendment issues were
broader than just the application of the trial publicity rule. See id. at 1034.
53. See generally id. at 1031 (balancing the First Amendment rights of attorneys to
discuss pending cases against the state's interest in having a fair trial).
54. The Court stated:
The matter before us does not call into question the constitutionality of other
States' prohibitions upon an attorney's speech that will have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," but is limited to Nevada's interpretation of that standard. On the other hand, one central point must
dominate the analysis: this case involves classic political speech. The State Bar of
Nevada reprimanded petitioner for his assertion, supported by a brief sketch of
his client's defense, that the State sought the indictment and conviction of an
innocent man as a "scapegoat" and had not "been honest enough to indict the
people who did it; the police department, crooked cops." At issue here is the
constitutionality of a ban on political speech critical of the government and its
officials.
Id. at 1034 (citation omitted).
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competent counsel is duty-bound to publicly speak for his client.5 5 On
this point, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, found:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door.
He or she cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may recommend a
plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the adverse consequences of a possible loss after trial, so too an attorney may take
reasonable steps to defend a client's reputation and reduce the
adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of a
prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with improper motives. A defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain
dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an
attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the
client does not deserve to be tried.5 6
57
Taking an offensive position may be the best way to defend a client.
Although attorneys are pushing the boundaries of the way services are marketed and delivered, there are limits. In Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n,5 8 the Supreme Court reviewed a case where a lawyer
directly solicited legal business from two individuals injured in an automobile accident.5 9 Although analyzing the matter in First Amendment terms, the Court grounded its discussion on the traditions of the
profession:
The solicitation of business by a lawyer through direct, in-person
communication with the prospective client has long been viewed
as inconsistent with the profession's ideal of the attorney-client
relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to the
prospective client. It has been proscribed by the organized Bar
for many years.60
The Court also recognized that the state has strong reasons to
regulate this form of commercial activity by a licensed professional.6 1
55. . See id. at 1043, 1048.
56. Id. at 1043.
57. For a discussion of such an approach involving attorney Ron Hoevet's defense of
Jeff Gillooly, ex-husband of Olympic skater Tonya Harding, see generally Peter R. Jarvis,
An Overview of the Hoevet Case, PROF. LAw., Nov. 1994, at 18. Mr. Hoevet held a press
conference to announce the plea agreement reached in charges stemming from Ms. Harding's involvement in the attack on fellow skater Nancy Kerrigan. See id. Mr. Hoevet was
subsequently charged with violating Oregon's version of ABA Model Rule 3.7; however,
the Oregon State Bar chose not to pursue disciplinary action. See id.
58. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
59. Lawyer Ohralik visited one client while she was still hospitalized and in traction.
See id. at 450. He visited the other one at her home directly after her release. See id. at
451.
60. Id. at 454.
61. The Court stated:
The state interests implicated in this case are particularly strong. In addition
to its general interest in protecting consumers and regulating commercial transac-
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The need to protect clients was at the heart of the later case of Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc.62 At issue in Went For It was a Florida Bar
regulation which required lawyers to wait for thirty days before they
could send direct-mail advertisements to mass disaster victims or their

families.63 The particular lawyer in that case was, in entrepreneurial
fashion, operating a lawyer referral service, essentially herding in victims of mass disasters and passing them on to other lawyers for a cut
of the action.64 The Supreme Court upheld the regulation, finding
that the state's interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens during
the emotional aftermath of a tragedy 65 and its interests in preserving
the professional image of lawyers,6 6 were strong enough to justify a
finding that such First Amendment speech could be restricted.6 7 Went
tions, the State bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards among
members of the licensed professions .... While lawyers act in part as "self-employed businessmen," they also act "as trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes."
Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
62. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
63. See id. at 620-21.
64. The facts were as follows:
In March 1992, G. Stewart McHenry and his wholly owned lawyer referral
service, Went For It, Inc., filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief ....
McHenry alleged that he routinely sent targeted solicitations to accident victims
or their survivors within 30 days after accidents and that he wished to continue
doing so in the future. Went For It, Inc. represented that it wished to contact
accident victims or their survivors within 30 days of accidents and to refer potential clients to participating Florida lawyers.
See id. at 621.
65. The Court stated, "The Florida Bar has argued, and the record reflects, that a
principal purpose of the ban is 'protecting the personal privacy and tranquility of [Florida's] citizens from crass commercial intrusion by attorneys upon their personal grief in
times of trauma."' Id. at 630 (alteration in original) (quoting from Brief for Petitioner at
8).
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy took a contrary view of what the weight of the evidence demonstrated. See id. at 640-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (finding that the "Summary of the Record" prepared by the Florida Bar, which is a "study," and other evidence
used by the majority to show harm were insufficient to show that the regulation advanced
the state's interest).
66. The Court stated:
The regulation, then, is an effort to protect the flagging reputations of Florida
lawyers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that, the Bar maintains, "'is
universally regarded as deplorable and beneath common decency because of its
intrusion upon the special vulnerability and private grief of victims or their
families.'
Id. at 625 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 28 (quoting In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1270 (N.J.
1992))).
67. See id. at 634-35.
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For It stands for the proposition that there are some ethical and professional limits on the marketing and provision of legal services.6 8
Went For It also ignited the old profession-business debate,
although it had been simmering since Bates.69 Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has consistently decried the commercialism movement.7 °
In Zauderer, Justice O'Connor left no doubt about where she stood in
the old debate, declaring, "The States understandably require more of
attorneys than of others engaged in commerce. Lawyers are professionals, and as such they have greater obligations. ' 71 In Peel, she
again reiterated her view that commercial speech should be regulated
by the States. 72 Finally, in Shapero, she called for an outright reversal
of the commercialism movement, stating:
68. Justice O'Connor concluded, "We believe that the Florida Bar's 30-day restriction
on targeted direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and their relatives withstands scrutiny under the three-part Central Hudson test that we have devised for this context." Id. at
635. But see Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d 1150, 1156 (1997) (restricting the breadth of a 30day restriction on direct mail advertisements by permitting this method in criminal
matters).
69. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977). After discussing his
view that the intractable matter of legal advertising regulations is best left to state bar
associations, Justice Powell expressed the following fears:
I am apprehensive, despite the Court's expressed intent to proceed cautiously, that today's holding will be viewed by tens of thousands of lawyers as an
invitation-by the public-spirited and the selfish lawyers alike-to engage in competitive advertising on an escalating basis. Some lawyers may gain temporary
advantages; others will suffer from the economic power of stronger lawyers, or by
the subtle deceit of less scrupulous lawyers. Some members of the public may
benefit marginally, but the risk is that many others will be victimized by simplistic
price advertising of professional services "almost infinite [in] variety and nature ..
" Until today, in the long history of the legal profession, it was not
thought that this risk of public deception was required by the marginal First
Amendment interests asserted by the Court.
Id. at 403-04 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
70. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S.
626, 673-74 (1985).
71. Id. at 676. She went on to describe her standard of higher duty:
The legal profession has in the past been distinguished and well served by a code
of ethics which imposes certain standards beyond those prevailing in the marketplace and by a duty to place professional responsibility above pecuniary gain.
While some assert that we have left the era of professionalism in the practice of
law, substantial state interests underlie many of the provisions of the state codes
of ethics, and justify more stringent standards than apply to the public at large.
Id. at 677 (citation omitted).
72. Justice O'Connor stated:
This case provides yet another example of the difficulties raised by rote application of the commercial speech doctrine in the context of state regulation of
professional standards for attorneys ....
Failure to accord States considerable
latitude in this area embroils this Court in the micromanagement of the State's
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In my judgment, however, fairly severe constraints on attorney
advertising can continue to play an important role in preserving
the legal profession as a genuine profession. Whatever may be
the exactly appropriate scope of these restrictions at a given
time and place, this Court's recent decisions reflect a myopic
belief that "consumers," and thus our Nation, will benefit from a
constitutional theory that refuses to recognize either the essence
of professionalism or its fragile and necessary foundations. In
one way or another, time will uncover the folly of this approach.
I can only hope that the Court will recognize the danger before
it is too late to effect a worthwhile cure.73
The majority opinion in Went For It was Justice O'Connor's
chance to make a stand for professionalism. While acknowledging
that under current law lawyers have "a great deal of leeway to devise
innovative ways to attract new business,, 74 the Court held that Florida's 30-day prohibition on targeted mailings was not constitutionally
defective. 75 But as the next section suggests, the mercantilists continue to move forward, powered by the forces of societal change.

IV.

EMERGING METHODS OF DELIVERING PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES

Professor Vestal views the commodification of legal services from
the lawyer's perspective and the resulting implications for lawyers'
ethical duties. 76 The trend, as he sees it, is driven by recent changes in
business entity law.77 Clearly lawyers are engaging in the same
choice-of-entity analysis that most businesses undergo at start-up. Liability, continuation, and tax consequences primarily inform the decision.7 8 Professor Susan Saab Fortney's article thoughtfully considers
the professional liability issues relevant to the choice-of-entity
decision.79
One could also view professional service options from the client's
perspective as a consumer of legal services.8 0 The information age has
made the consumer of legal services more knowledgeable. Further,
inherent authority to police the ethical standards of
borders.
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496
73. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 491
74. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633
75. See id. at 635.
76. See generally Vestal, supra note 19.
77. See id. at 494-95.
78. See id. at 470 n.119.
79. See generally Fortney, supra note 21.
80. See Morgan, supra note 18, at 243.

the profession within its
U.S. 91, 119 (1990).
(1988) (citation omitted).
(1995).
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consumers demand economic value and quality services. Increasing
competition in the marketplace is placing demands on lawyers to be
creative in the delivery of legal services. Clients are no longer blindly
loyal to one firm. If they cannot get the price, the quality of service,
and the satisfaction they demand from one law firm, they will and do
walk down the street to another provider of legal services.8 ' This is a
further reflection of the entrepreneurial age in which we currently
live.
Factor into this trend the changing expectations of consumers of
professional services. Rare it is that we have a close personal relationship with a trusted family doctor or a local, revered lawyer in whom
we place unquestioning trust. Consumers of professional services demand the best, seek equal decision-making authority, and pursue redress if expectations are not met. They also demand choices and
options. This is the cogent point made by Professor Thomas Morgan-that legal services are being delivered in new and entrepreneurial modalities.8 2 However, multiple and varied layers of
service delivery mechanisms can work to frustrate consumer expectations, leading to increased consumer complaints and more lawsuits.83
Economic forces in the marketplace are driving service delivery
modalities.84 All professionals, including doctors, accountants, financial advisors, and lawyers, are being pushed to be innovative in the
way professional services are delivered.85 Increased numbers of practitioners, increased costs of services, and new entrants into the field
are pushing professionals to be innovative in the way they practice.
Information technology, computerization of the workplace, and faster
81. As one commentator stated:
Big-time practice has apparently become much more volatile; it is much less usual
for a business to retain a single "outside" firm, and to stay married to that firm
forever. Legal practice has become more "transactional," that is, a big company
will hire lawyers and law firms for a particular "matter" or "deal," often a very
large one to be sure. There is less or no loyalty to the "old firm." Law firms are
becoming expendable, like advertising agencies. In a transactional legal world,
slow and steady no longer wins the race. Law firms cannot rely on fixed, stable
relationships with business clients.
Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1602

(1989) (citation omitted).
82. See Morgan, supra note 18, at 216-17.
83. See, e.g., James Podgers, Rediscovering the Middle Class, 80 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1994,
at 61, 61-62 (describing the bar's resistance to new legal service delivery mechanisms).
84. See Nancy Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues Emerging
From the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 497, 499 (1998).
85. See, e.g., F. Leary Davis, Back to the Future: The Buyer's Market and the Need for
Law Firm Leadership, Creativity and Innovation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 147, 148 (1994)

(discussing the need for innovative legal services).
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methods of electronic communication enhance the possibilities of
practicing creatively.86 But also, the new technologies force practitioners to keep up with the swift changes or be left behind.87 Moreover, as Professor Nancy Moore's insightful essay on the challenges
facing in-house counsel suggests, institutions outside of the traditional
bar are shaping the way professional services are delivered.88
Here it is instructive to borrow from the medical field. We all are
confronted with the need to obtain, utilize, and purchase medical services. At a time when the information age has also ushered in the commodification of medical professional services, the delivery of medical
services is undergoing fundamental changes driven by entrepreneurial
advances. Consumers of professional services have access to more information about the wonders of medicine.
Specialization in the practice of medicine and tremendous technical advancements in the treatment of illnesses have heightened our
expectations of what the medical community can accomplish. Yet
these new medical miracles are not inexpensive and are not without
risk. This brave new world demands creative methods of medical
services distribution in an efficient manner, which contains costs, and
in an effective manner, which assures quality or competent care.89
In a recent University of Alabama School of Law faculty colloquium, my colleague William Brewbaker examined healthcare delivery in a managed care regime. 90 His presentation was entitled
Medical Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The Implied
Warranty of Quality.91 He commented on three facets of the trend in
delivery of medical services in a variety of modalities which are instructive for our purposes.92 First, forces in the medical marketplace
86.

See, e.g., Roger L. Rutherford, Computers '96: The Information Explosion Contin-

ues, 84 ILL. B.J., May 1996, at 263, 263-64 (explaining the need for attorneys to acquire
computer skills in current practice).
87. See James Podgers, Changing Times, Changing Rules, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 62,
for a series of mini-articles by various attorneys on such issues as representing elder clients,
new arbitration rules, and the use of e-mail, fax, and cellular phones.
88. Cf. Moore, supra note 84, at 497-99.
89. See generally Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping With Quality!
Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6 (1975) (stating
that Professional Standards Review Organizations are likely to enhance the quality of
medical care and to produce some other significant benefits).
90. See William S. Brewbaker, III, Medical Malpracticeand Managed Care Organizations: The Implied Warranty of Quality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 1997) (on
file with the South Texas Law Review).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1-7. Reflections produced here are drawn from his colloquium presentation, a draft copy of his article, and conversations I had with Professor Brewbaker. He
also provided helpful references for this article.
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are driving physicians to contract with managed care organizations to
provide medical care as specified in plans in which patients are enrolled.93 Second, the managed care organizations, in seeking to operate profitably, make demands on doctors which may restrict or limit
the quantity and quality of medical services provided.9 4 There is an
issue as to whether the contractual relationship with the managed care
organization compromises the medical judgment of the physician.
Third, over time, significant changes in tort law, especially products
liability, have increased the universe of potential medical malpractice
actions.9 5 Informed consumers and their lawyers do not hesitate to
demand that medical services meet high standards of quality. These
three facets create new and unprecedented tensions between the suppliers of healthcare (managed care organizations), the providers of
healthcare (physicians and hospitals), and the consumers of healthcare
(patients).9 6 Professor Brewbaker proposes that both the suppliers
and providers of healthcare services be responsible for the quality of
those services. 97 He in fact suggests that, when a patient with a prepaid medical plan walks into a medical facility or doctor's office, there
is an implied warranty of quality on services received. 98
Similarly, interwoven into the discourse of this symposium is the
search for ways to respond to new entrepreneurial realities in the way
law practice is structured. 99 The pressure to creatively and innovatively manage entrepreneurial change in the marketplace produces
new tensions between the consumer of legal services and the legal service provider. This is aggravated by external institutions structuring
the market in ways designed to promote either economic efficiency or
to control the parameters of liability for professional malpractice.' 00
93. See id. at 1.
94. See id. at 1, 55.
95. See id. at 3-18.
96. See id. at 1-2.
97. See id. at 19-44, 55-62.
98. See id.
99. This is part of the risk and part of the increased cost that flows from the everexpanding basis of tort liability that professionals face. In products liability litigation, we
have gone well beyond privity into a land in which no one has ever traveled before (witness
the cigarette litigation). See Jan H. Schut, Where There's Smoke: The Insurance Industry
Would Like To Think It's Safe from Tobacco Liability, INSTITUTIONAL INV., July 1, 1997, at
147, 147. Professionals and distributors of professional services are in an age of uncertainty. The potential exposure to unlimited liability in tort impacts the manner in which
services are delivered. It is unclear what impact new methods of delivery will have on
quality assurance. More post-symposium reflection is in order.
100. For a consideration of complex issues of lawyer regulation by a variety of non-Bar
institutions, see generally Special Issue, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1996).
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Professor Ted Schneyer's broad review of non-bar regulatory techniques reflects this trend. 01' As the simpler times of earlier legal traditions are swallowed by this era of entrepreneurial complexity, the
ultimate question remains: who is liable or who is responsible for the
professional services, that are delivered regardless of the delivery modality? Attorney Robert Keatinge's presentation on the obligations of
supervising attorneys provided insight on how we wrestle with finding
the locus of responsibility for delivering a quality product.10 2 In words
that Justice O'Connor would approve, the delivery of legal service,
regardless of the structure of the association, requires the integrity
and commitment of a professional in the classic sense.' 0 3
V.

CONCLUSION:

A

RETURN TO CORE VALUES

Given these trends, how do we honor both efficiency, in a time
when resources are constricting and clients seek value, and effectiveness, when the demand for quality services in a variety of formats is
expanding? We must go back to the future and retrieve our core professional values, viewing them anew in light of a major paradigm shift
in the delivery of professional services. Essential to a design of a professional services delivery system should be the commitment to quality and wide access at a reasonable cost. From an entrepreneurial
perspective, the present realities open amazing opportunities to preserve the best from the past to use in an ever-changing future.
First, let us return to our original concise statement on entrepreneurship: "Entrepreneurship is the process of creating value by pulling together a unique package of resources to exploit an
opportunity.' ' 1°4 Certainly, a fuller study of entrepreneurship would
produce a broader definition of the subject. Such a study would recognize that a significant portion of the literature on entrepreneurship
considers quality a key factor to success in the endeavor and a way to
measure value to the client. Whatever product or service one is offering, the service provider is committed to doing his or her best, at all
101. Professor Schneyer explored some of these issues in the Fordham Symposium on
institutional regulatory issues. See generally Ted Schneyer, Legal ProcessScholarship and
the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996) (noting that a number of private institutions regulate lawyers, such as the legal services market, law firms, and watchdog journalists).
102. See generally Robert R. Keatinge, The Floggings Will Continue Until Morale Improves: The Supervising Attorney and His or Her Firm, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 279 (1998).

103.
104.

See supra notes 69-73 and accompan ying text.
STEVENSON, supra note 4, at 16.
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times, with integrity. Quality is a search for excellence, a guaranteed
way to stand out from the crowd of mediocrity.
Philip Crosby has described quality this way: "Quality is free. It's
not a gift, but it is free. What costs money are the unquality thingsall the actions that involve not doing jobs right the first time."' 5 If
you do a task right the first time, you do not have to pay for the cost
of having to do it over or for the damages caused for failing to deliver
a quality service. 10 6 Crosby advises that quality can be achieved if one
identifies appropriate standards and builds the pursuit of those standards into the way a business is run.'0 7 In teaching how to make quality a part of managing a business, he said:
[W]e must define quality as "conformance to requirements" if
we are to manage it. Thus, those who want to talk about quality
of life must define that life in specific terms, such as desirable
income, health, pollution control, political programs, and other
items that can each be measured. When all criteria are defined
and explained, then the measurement of quality of life is possible and practical.
In business the same is true. Requirements must be clearly
stated so that they cannot be misunderstood. Measurements are
then taken continually to determine conformance to those requirements. The nonconformance detected is the absence of
quality. Quality problems become nonconformance problems,
and quality becomes definable. 0 8
This fits neatly into the theme of this symposium, the ethical obligations and liabilities (or conformance requirements as Crosby might
say) arising from lawyers' professional associations. Professor Vestal's
concern about commercialism' 019 can be turned into an opportunity to
define the standards of good business practices for lawyers practicing
in the entrepreneurial age. We are identifying ethical obligations and
liabilities by describing the incidents when lawyers have to pay extra
105. PHILIP B. CROSBY, QUALITY Is FREE: THE ART OF MAKING QUALITY CERTAIN 1
(1979).
106. As Crosby notes:
There is no such thing as economics of quality. It is always cheaper to do the job
right the first time. Many companies confuse their people by using the sampling
inspection criteria of acceptable quality levels as performance standards. As a
result, each operation takes its 1 percent. The only proper standard is Zero
Defects.
Id. at 271. Zero defects is a standard most lawyers were taught in legal writing classes.
Any submissions to the court should be proofread and have zero errors in form or in
citations to references.
107. See id. at 3-14.
108. Id. at 17.
109. See Vestal, supra note 19, at 457-60 (arguing that economic changes have transformed the traditional practice of law into a mercantilist model).
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costs for not doing it right the first time. From a lawyer's perspective,
quality can be measured by identifying the requirements of excellent
legal practice. When we make mistakes in the practice of law, when
we are implicated in the misdeeds of our clients (like the savings and
loan scandals), and when we treat clients as secondary to our pursuit
of profit, we are then not providing a quality service. This absence of
quality, or nonconformance to professional ideals, costs us in terms of
professional malpractice damages, fines, ethical complaints, and loss
of client business.
I make two final observations about not conforming to professional requirements. First, for those who do not meet standards of
quality, the pressures of the marketplace will weed out unprofessional
entrepreneurial lawyers. Professor Schneyer's account of lawyer and
law firm sanctions by non-bar legal and regulatory institutions is testimony to this.11° Lawyers who overreach their clients or are obnoxious
in their pursuit of business will lose clients. The remarks of Justice
Kennedy in his dissent in Went For It are apropos:
The reasonableness of the State's chosen methods for redressing
perceived evils can be evaluated, in part, by a commonsense
consideration of other possible means of regulation that have
not been tried. Here, the Court neglects the fact that this problem is largely self-policing: Potential clients will not hire lawyers
who offend them. And even if a person enters into a contract
with an attorney and later regrets it, Florida, like some other
States, allows clients to rescind certain contracts with attorneys
within a stated time after they are executed.'
Second, an inherent sense of professionalism will guide good lawyers' conduct and the pursuit of quality. Many panelists commented
on the National Law Journalreport on firms who have decided against
forming limited liability professional associations."1 2 These firms will
collectively manage the quality of their work product and stand behind it. Professor Charles Wolfram further emphasized this in his discussion of client-centered lawyering." 3 Significantly, the Bates
opinion recognized the core values inherent in professionalism in an
entrepreneurial age:
It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at
110. See Schneyer, supra note 101, at 35-36.
111. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 643 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
112. See generally Darryl Van Duch, Some Firms Hesitate to Adopt L.L.P., NAT'L L.J.,
May 5, 1997, at Al.
113. See Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 361-62 (1998).
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one point, and, at another, to assert that its members will seize
opportunity to mislead and distort. We suspect that, with
advertising, most lawyers will behave as they always have: They
will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and
honor of their profession and of the legal system. For every attorney who overreaches through advertising, there will be
thousands of others who will be candid and honest and straightforward. And, of course, it will be in the latter's interest, as in
other cases of misconduct at the bar, to assist in weeding out
those few who abuse their trust." 4
It is incumbent on us to continue to identify evolving practice
modalities which call for revising professional standards, such as Professor Moore has done with her review of in-house counsel obligations. 11 5 Further, it is important to advocate for the position that
lawyers who practice in professional associations monitor and supervise each other's work. If for no other reason, this is the way to establish a good, quality-focused business for practicing law. Finally, those
of us who teach future lawyers should boldly and without embarrassment proclaim the high virtues of our great profession." 6 While the
bad apples receive significant press, we know former students and
alumni of our institutions who practice creatively and innovatively in
the grand old style with honor, integrity, and commitment to excellence in an entrepreneurial age.
-the

114. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977).
115. See generally Moore, supra note 84 (exploring conflict issues that confront corporate in-house counsel).
116. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal
Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism As a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 393 (1990/91)
(expounding upon the relationship between professionalism and morality and virtue in an
inaugural address at Hofstra University).

